Revisions to the Entity List

<RULE> DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE <SUBAGY>Bureau of Industry and Security</SUBAGY> <CFR>15 CFR Part 744</CFR> <DEPDOC>[Docket No. 240820-0222]</DEPDOC> <RIN>RIN 0694-AJ79</RIN> <SUBJECT>Revisions to the Entity List</SUBJECT> <HD SOURCE="HED">AGENCY:</HD> Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce. <HD SOURCE="HED">ACTION:</HD> Final rule. <SUM> <HD SOURCE="HED">SUMMARY:</HD> In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destinations of Canada (1), the People's Republic of China (China) (42), the Crimea Region of Ukraine (1), Cyprus (1), Iran (11), Kazakhstan (1), Kyrgyzstan (1), Russia (63), Turkey (8), Ukraine (1), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (1). Three entities are added to the Entity List under two destinations and two entities are added to the Entity List under three destinations, which accounts for the difference in the totals. These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. </SUM> <EFFDATE> <HD SOURCE="HED">DATES:</HD> This rule is effective August 27, 2024. </EFFDATE> <FURINF> <HD SOURCE="HED">FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:</HD> Chair, End-User Review Committee, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, Phone: (202) 482-5991, Email: <E T="03">ERC@bis.doc.gov.</E> </FURINF> <SUPLINF> <HD SOURCE="HED">SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:</HD> <HD SOURCE="HD1">Background</HD> The Entity List (supplement no. 4 to part 744 of the EAR (15 CFR parts 730 through 774)) identifies entities for which there is reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable facts, that the entities have been involved, are involved, or pose a significant risk of being or becoming involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States, pursuant to § 744.11(b). The EAR impose additional license requirements on, and limit the availability of, most license exceptions for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) when a listed entity is a party to the transaction. The license review policy for each listed entity is identified in the “License Review Policy” column on the Entity List, and the impact on the availability of license exceptions is described in the relevant <E T="04">Federal Register</E> document that added the entity to the Entity List. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) places entities on the Entity List pursuant to part 744 (Control Policy: End-User and End-Use Based) and part 746 (Embargoes and Other Special Controls) of the EAR. The End-User Review Committee (ERC), composed of representatives of the Departments of Commerce (Chair), State, Defense, Energy and, where appropriate, the Treasury, makes all decisions regarding additions to, removals from, or other modifications to the Entity List. The ERC makes all decisions to add an entry to the Entity List by majority vote and makes all decisions to remove or modify an entry by unanimous vote. <HD SOURCE="HD2">Additions to the Entity List</HD> The ERC determined to add Megatek TI Solutions, under the destination of Canada, and MAK Logistics; Megatek Ltd.; Wellgo International Industrial Limited; and Yield Bright Industrial Limited, all under the destination of China to the Entity List. These entities are added for providing U.S.-origin electronics and other items to Russian industry and military-related parties without the required BIS licenses. This activity is contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests under § 744.11 of the EAR. These entities are added with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR and a license review policy of presumption of denial. The ERC determined to add eight entities to the Entity List: Incomp Limited, under the destination of China; All Global Trading Elektronik Dis Ticaret Ltd Sti, under the destinations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey; Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Radiotekhkomplekt, Izumrud AO, and Severny Reid AO, under the destination of Russia; and ASR Trans Lojistik Ve Dis Tic Ltd Sti, BRK Uluslararasi Nakliyat Tic. Ltd. Sti, and Turkik Union Dijital Teknoloji Donusum Ofisi, under the destination of Turkey. These entities are connected to transshipment networks involved in sending sensitive U.S.-origin technology to Russia. This activity is contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests under § 744.11 of the EAR. The ERC has determined that these entities qualify as Russian Procurement Entities under § 734.9(g) of the EAR and are receiving a footnote 3 designation due to their significant risk of involvement in the supply or diversion of items subject to the EAR to procurement networks for Russia's defense industry or intelligence services. A footnote 3 designation subjects these entities to the Russia/Belarus-Military End User and Procurement Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule, detailed in § 734.9(g). These entities are added with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR. They are added with a license review policy of denial. The End User Review Committee determined to add two addresses, Address 09 and Address 10, under the destination of China and one address, Address 01, under the destination of Turkey to the Entity List. These addresses are associated with significant transshipment of sensitive goods to Russia. BIS has verified that these addresses are associated with a significant number of entities whose activities risk violating the EAR. These risks include associations with parties on the Entity List or the Unverified List at the listed addresses. These activities are contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests under § 744.11 of the EAR. Licenses will be required for all entities at these addresses for all items that are subject to the EAR on the Commerce Control List and supplement no. 7 of part 746 of the EAR. License applications will be reviewed with a license review policy of presumption of denial. The ERC determined to add the following 34 entities to the Entity List: 3-K Electronics Limited; AllChips Limited; Chipgoo Electronics Limited; Cinty Int'l (HK) Industry Co., Limited; Cloudmax Tech Co., Limited; DGT Technology (HK) Co., Limited; Eastech Electronics Limited; Furuida Heilongjiang Supply Chain Management Co., Ltd.; Grun Group Co., Limited; Hongkong Inkson Technology Limited; Hong Kong Haiheng Electronics Co. Ltd.; Hong Kong Qisu Electronic Technology Co. Ltd.; Hong Kong Yayang Trading Ltd.; Hytera Communications Limited; ICsole Technology Limited; Kvantek Limited; Lett Tronic Group Limited; LL Electronic Limited; Mei Xin Electronic (HK) Co., Limited; Midas Lighting Limited; Minhoo Logistics Limited; O-Nice Trading Co. Limited; Piraclinos Limited; RYX Electronic (HK) Limited; Shenzhen Bailiansheng Electronic Science and Technology Co., Ltd; Shenzhen BZ Space Technology Co., Ltd.; Shenzhen Dongpengshang Electronics Co., Ltd.; Shenzhen SCH Technology Co., Ltd.; Siliborn Technology Limited; Superchip Limited; Tengxuxing Electronic Technology HK Limited; and Yusha Group Co. Ltd. under the destination of China; Merlion Trade Worldwide Ltd. under the destination of Cyprus; and Confienza Pazarlama Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi under the destination of Turkey. These entities are added for continuing to procure or attempting to procure items in support of Russia's military and/or defense industrial base. Specifically, these 34 entities have supplied U.S.-origin and U.S.-branded components on behalf of Russian entities that have been sanctioned since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine or are otherwise linked to the Russian defense industrial base. This activity is contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests under § 744.11 of the EAR. The ERC has determined that these entities qualify as Russian Procurement Entities under § 734.9(g) of the EAR and are receiving a footnote 3 designation due to their significant risk of involvement in the supply or diversion of items subject to the EAR to procurement networks for Russia's defense industry or intelligence services. A footnote 3 designation subjects these entities to the Russia/Belarus-Military End User and Procurement Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule, as detailed in § 734.9(g) of the EAR. These entities are added with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR. They are added with a license review policy of denial. The ERC determined to add eleven entities under the destination of Iran to the Entity List for actions contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States: Arvin Fan Avar Vira Company; BuyBest Electronic; Digi Ghate; Fidar System Pooyan; General Electronic; IC Kala; Iran Compo Co.; Javan Electronic Company; SkyTech Electronic; Tehran Pishro Trading Co.; and Zagros Electronic. BuyBest Electronic is also being listed under the destinations of China and Turkey, and Tehran Pishro Trading Co. is also listed under the destinations of China and the United Arab Emirates. These eleven entities under fifteen entries are connected to the supply of, or attempts to supply, U.S.-origin items to Iran, some of which are Tier 1 items on the Common High Priority List of items needed by Russia's military to sustain its brutal attack on Ukraine. ( <E T="03">See https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/all-articles/13-policy-guidance/country-guidance/2172-russia-export-controls-list-of-common-high-priority-items.</E> ) This activity is contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests under § 744.11 of the EAR. These entities are added with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR and a license review policy of ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ Preview showing 10k of 149k characters. Full document text is stored and available for version comparison. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━