Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

<NOTICE> DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE <SUBAGY>Bureau of Industry and Security</SUBAGY> <SUBJECT>Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges </SUBJECT> <FP SOURCE="FP-1">Kirill Gordei, 500 NE 12th Ave. #706, Hallandale Beach, FL 33009;</FP> <FP SOURCE="FP-1">Apelsin Logistics Inc., 500 NE 12th Ave. #706, Hallandale Beach, FL 33009;</FP> <FP SOURCE="FP-1">FC Marakanda 7777 LLC, Obod MFI, Temur A Street 65, Yangiulskiy Region, Tashkent, Uzbekistan;</FP> <FP SOURCE="FP-1">Alinda Chemical Trade Company LTD a/k/a/Alinda, Kuskovskaya Street 20A, Entrance B, Office 409, Moscow, Russia 111141;</FP> <FP SOURCE="FP-1"> Element Uluslararasi Nakliyat Ve Lojistick Tic. LTD, Sehit Polis Fethi Sekin Caddesi no:4, Novus Tower Kat:28 D:281-282, Bayrakli, Izmir 35530, Türkiye; </FP> <FP SOURCE="FP-1">Astec Astronomy FZCO, Dubai Silicon Oasis, DDP, Building A1, IFZA Property FZCO, Dubai, UAE;</FP> <FP SOURCE="FP-1">And</FP> <FP SOURCE="FP-1">Dubai Silicon Oasis, DDP, Building A2, IFZY Business Park DDP, Dubai, UAE;</FP> <FP SOURCE="FP-1">AvioChem a/k/a/Avio Chem Doo a/k/a/Avio Star a/k/a AvioNet, Aerodrom Beograd 59, 111271 Surcin, Serbia</FP> Pursuant to section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (“EAR” or “the Regulations”), <SU>1</SU> <FTREF/> the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”), has requested the issuance of an Order temporarily denying, for a period of 180 days, the export privileges under the Regulations of: Kirill Gordei (“Gordei”), Apelsin Logistics Inc. (“Apelsin”), FC Marakanda 7777 LLC (“Marakanda”), Alinda Chemical Trade Company LTD (“Alinda”), Element Uluslararasi Nakliyat Ve Lojistick Tic. LTD (“Element”), Astec Astronomy FZCO (“Astec”), and AvioChem (collectively, the “Respondents”). OEE's request and related information indicate that these parties are located at the respective addresses listed on the caption page of this order. The OEE investigation has shown that Gordei, through his Florida-based freight forwarding company Apelsin, has facilitated the transshipment of U.S.-origin goods to Russia by communicating with parties in Russia and Türkiye to instruct them on how to circumvent U.S. export controls, falsifying shipping documentation, and utilizing freight forwarders located abroad in order to transship items to Russia. <FTNT> <SU>1</SU>  The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (2025), were originally issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015) (“EAA”), which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by successive Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, <E T="03">et seq.</E> (2012)) (“IEEPA”). On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (“ECRA”). While section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections which are inapplicable here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. </FTNT> <HD SOURCE="HD1">I. Legal Standard</HD> Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an “imminent violation” of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). “A violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.” 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show “either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.” <E T="03">Id.</E> As to the likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge “is significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]” <E T="03">Id.</E> A “[l]ack of information establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a violation.” <E T="03">Id.</E> <HD SOURCE="HD1">II. OEE's Request for a Temporary Denial Order (“TDO”)</HD> The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian Federation's (“Russia's”) further invasion of Ukraine by implementing a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict Russia's access to technologies and other items that it needs to sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily target Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs, atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage. As of February 24, 2022, any item classified under any Export Classification Control Number (“ECCN”) in Categories 3 through 9 of the Commerce Control List (“CCL”) required a license to be exported or reexported to Russia. <E T="03">See</E> 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). As of April 8, 2022, the license requirements for Russia were expanded to cover all items on the CCL. <E T="03">See</E> 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). These rules were codified in title 15 CFR 746.8, which state, “a license is required, excluding deemed exports and deemed reexports, to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or within Russia or Belarus any item subject to the EAR and specified in any Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) on the CCL.” BIS has imposed additional license requirements for exports, reexports and transfers to or within Russia of any items subject to the EAR that were identified under certain Schedule B or Harmonized Tariff Schedule 6 (“HTS”) numbers under Supplement No. 4 to Part 746—Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions Pursuant to § 746.5(a)(1)(ii). <SU>2</SU> <FTREF/> HTS codes take their first six digits from the corresponding Harmonized System (“HS”) code, a standardized numerical method of classifying traded products used by customs authorities around the world. <FTNT> <SU>2</SU>   <E T="03">See, e.g.,</E> 87 FR 12856 (March 8, 2022). </FTNT> In its request, OEE presented evidence indicating that the Respondents seek to procure various U.S.-origin commodities, including items classified as ECCNs 3A999.b and 9A991, and transship them to Russia without seeking the required authorization from BIS, contrary to the requirements in the Regulations. <HD SOURCE="HD2">A. Mass Spectrometer Export</HD> Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the resultant implementation of BIS export controls affecting the Russian aviation industry, several of the Respondents engaged in a scheme to export a Mass Spectrometer, classified under ECCN 3A999.b and under 6-digit HTS code 902781, from the United States to Russia without the required license from BIS. <SU>3</SU> <FTREF/> <FTNT> <SU>3</SU>   <E T="03">See</E> 15 CFR 746.8(a)(1), (a)(5). </FTNT> OEE has presented evidence that on or about August 4, 2023, Gordei, who at all relevant times was the President of Apelsin, was provided falsified shipping documents from an individual associated with Alinda (hereinafter “Individual 1”) for the purposes of shipping the Mass Spectrometer to Russia. The Mass Spectrometer was purchased from a U.S. company located in California (hereinafter “U.S. Company 1”) by Marakanda. Individual 1 informed Gordei that this type of item requires a BIS export license to Russia otherwise it would be detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”). Moreover, Individual 1 instructed Gordei that U.S. Company 1 should not be reflected in the documents and instead provided Gordei with at least two sets of falsified shipping documentation, including false commercial invoices reflecting two different, unrelated, U.S. companies as the sellers. These documents also reflected that the Mass Spectrometer would be shipped to Element, in Türkiye. On or about August 21, 2023, through on or about August 25, 2023, Gordei arranged the transshipment of the Mass Spectrometer from Element in Türkiye to a company operating in Moscow, Russia. After informing Element that the “real” ultimate consignee for the shipment was located in Moscow, Russia, Gordei provided Element with the falsified shipping documentation, and confirmed to Individual 1 that Element agreed to transship the item to the consignee located in Moscow. This consignee was listed at the same address as Alinda and likely served as front or fictitious name for Alinda. Gordei and Apelsin then directed a U.S.-based freight forwarder to file Electronic Export Information using the falsified documents. These documents falsely stated that Marakanda in Uzbekistan was the ultimate consignee, with the shipment to be routed initially to Element in Türkiye. On or about August 28, 2023, Element sent an email to Gordei advising him that the estimated departure date of the Mass Spectrometer from Türkiye to Russia was going to be August 29, 2023, and attached an air waybill issued by a Russian airline. 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