Siberian Airlines d/b/a S7 Airlines, 633104, Russia, Novosibirskaya obl., g. Ob. prospekt Mozzherina, d. 10 ofis 201; Order Renewing Temporary Denial of Export Privileges

<NOTICE> DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE <SUBAGY>Bureau of Industry and Security</SUBAGY> <SUBJECT>Siberian Airlines d/b/a S7 Airlines, 633104, Russia, Novosibirskaya obl., g. Ob. prospekt Mozzherina, d. 10 ofis 201; Order Renewing Temporary Denial of Export Privileges </SUBJECT> Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730-774 (“EAR” or “the Regulations”), <SU>1</SU> <FTREF/> I hereby grant the request of the Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”) to renew the temporary denial order (“TDO”) issued in this matter on December 6, 2024. I find that renewal of this order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations and that renewal for an extended period is appropriate because Siberian Airlines d/b/a S7 Airlines (“Siberian”) has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR. <FTNT> <SU>1</SU>  On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (“NDAA”), which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (“ECRA”). While Section 1766 of the NDAA repeals the provisions of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2401 <E T="03">et seq.</E> (“EAA”), (except for three sections which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of the NDAA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 <E T="03">et seq.</E> (“IEEPA”), and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, Section 4820(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5). </FTNT> <HD SOURCE="HD1">I. Procedural History</HD> On June 24, 2022, the then-Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement signed an order denying Siberian export privileges for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order was issued <E T="03">ex parte</E> pursuant to Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations and was effective upon issuance. <SU>2</SU> <FTREF/> The temporary denial order was subsequently renewed on December 20, 2022, June 15, 2023, December 11, 2023, and December 6, 2024, respectively and were also effective upon issuance. <SU>3</SU> <FTREF/> <FTNT> <SU>2</SU>  The TDO was published in the <E T="04">Federal Register</E> on June 29, 2022 (87 FR 38709). </FTNT> <FTNT> <SU>3</SU>  The December 20, 2022 renewal order was published in the <E T="04">Federal Register</E> on December 23, 2022 (87 FR 78921). The June 15, 2023 renewal order was published in the <E T="04">Federal Register</E> on June 21, 2023 (88 FR 40205). The December 11, 2023 renewal order was published in the <E T="04">Federal Register</E> on December 14, 2023 (88 FR 86626). The December 6, 2024 renewal order was published in the <E T="04">Federal Register</E> on December 13, 2024 (89 FR 100952). </FTNT> On November 5, 2025, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request for a renewal of the TDO. The written request was made more than 20 days before the TDO's scheduled expiration and, given the temporary suspension of international mail service to Russia, OEE has attempted to deliver a copy of the renewal request to Siberian by alternative means in accordance with Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received. <HD SOURCE="HD1">II. Renewal of the TDO</HD> <HD SOURCE="HD2">A. Legal Standard</HD> Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an “imminent violation” of the Regulations, or any order, license or authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). “A violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.” 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show “either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.” <E T="03">Id.</E> As to the likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge “is significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]” <E T="03">Id.</E> A “lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a violation.” <E T="03">Id.</E> If BIS believes that renewal of a denial order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation, it may file a written request for renewal, with any modifications if appropriate. 15 CFR 766.24(d)(1). The written request, which must be filed no later than 20 days prior to the TDO's expiration, should set forth the basis for BIS's belief that renewal is necessary, including any additional or changed circumstances. <E T="03">Id.</E> “In cases demonstrating a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations, BIS may request the renewal of a temporary denial order for an additional period not exceeding one year.”  <SU>4</SU> <FTREF/> <E T="03">Id.</E> <FTNT> <SU>4</SU>  88 FR 59791 (Aug. 30, 2023). </FTNT> <HD SOURCE="HD2">B. The TDO and BIS's Request for Renewal</HD> The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian Federation's (“Russia's”) further invasion of Ukraine by implementing a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict Russia's access to technologies and other items that it needs to sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily target Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs, atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage. Effective February 24, 2022, BIS imposed expansive controls on aviation-related ( <E T="03">e.g.,</E> Commerce Control List Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia, including a license requirement for the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts specified in Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 9A991 (Section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR). <SU>5</SU> <FTREF/> BIS will review any export or reexport license applications for such items under a policy of denial. <E T="03">See</E> Section 746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS excluded any aircraft registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Russia or a national of Russia from being eligible for license exception Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (“AVS”) (Section 740.15 of the EAR). <SU>6</SU> <FTREF/> Accordingly, any U.S.-origin aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin content, and that is registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Russia or a national of Russia, is subject to a license requirement before it can travel to Russia. <FTNT> <SU>5</SU>  87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). </FTNT> <FTNT> <SU>6</SU>  87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022). </FTNT> OEE's request for renewal for a period of one year is based upon the facts underlying the issuance of the TDO and the renewal orders subsequently issued in this matter on December 20, 2022, June 15, 2023, December 11, 2023, and December 6, 2024, as well as other evidence developed during this investigation. This evidence demonstrates that Siberian has continued, and continues, to act in blatant disregard for U.S. export controls and the terms of previously issued TDOs. Specifically, the initial TDO, issued on June 24, 2022, was based on evidence that Siberian engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations by operating multiple aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights into Russia after March 2, 2022 from destinations including, but not limited to, Atyrau, Kazakhstan, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and Urgench, Uzbekistan, without the required BIS authorization. <SU>7</SU> <FTREF/> Further evidence indicated that Siberian also operated aircraft subject to the EAR on domestic flights within Russia, in apparent violation of Section 736.2(b)(10) of the Regulations. <FTNT> <SU>7</SU>  Publicly available flight tracking information shows, for example, that on March 10, 2022, serial number (“SN”), 41400 flew from Atyrau, Kazakhstan to Moscow, Russia. On May 1, 2022, SN 41707 flew from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan to Novosibirsk, Russia and, on March 4, 2022, SN 41841 flew from Urgench, Uzbekistan to Moscow, Russia. </FTNT> As discussed in the prior renewal orders, BIS presented evidence indicating that, after the initial TDO issued, Siberian continued to operate aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights both into and out of Russia, in violation of the Regulations and the TDO itself. <SU>8</SU> <FTREF/> The December 20, 2022 renewal order detailed flights into and out of Russia from/to Bangkok, Thailand, Antalya, Türkiye, and Urgench, Uzbekistan. <SU>9</SU> <FTREF/> The June 15, 2023 order documented a similar pattern of prohibited conduct. <SU>10</SU> <FTREF/> Similarly, the December 11, 2023 order detailed flights into and out of Russia from/to Bangkok, Thailand, Fergana, Uzbekistan, and Istanbul, Türki ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ Preview showing 10k of 20k characters. 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